Alois Riegl is known as a pioneer of formal analysis, but his theory of beholding contradicts formalistic preoccupations. The essay interprets this theory in the intellectual context of fin-de-si&cle Vienna, arguing that Riegl regarded the relationship to the beholder not as the formal means, but as the ethical purpose of art, and defended the beholder's participation against the charge of "theatricality." Riegl's "formal" theory, too, was not hermetic, but responsive to the same intellectual challenge as the theory of beholding. A brief discussion of intellectual currents in the later twentieth century reveals the strengths and limitations of Riegl's endeavor.
than dialogism, can subvert formalism, or is fated always to be coopted by it.
The Attentive Act
Riegl was conscious of the consequences of the historian's acknowledgement of the beholder. In private notes of the mid-1890's, he identified the relationship between the beholder and the work of art as the central issue of art history, relegating the analysis of the work of art in itself to "aesthetics." "Aesthetics," he wrote, "[is the] relation of parts to the whole.
[The] relation of the parts among themselves. [It] has not taken the relation to the beholder into consideration. The relation to the beholder constitutes art history. Its general principles make up historical aesthetics."9 If concern for the beholder distinguished history from philosophy, then Riegl himself was an aesthetician, not an art historian. Spditrdmische Kunstindustrie, after all, seemed to treat "aesthetics," the relationship among parts, not "art history," the relationship to the beholder, even if it did so historically and relativistically, not in the traditional philosophical sense.10
If he were an "aesthetician," he may have had good reason. "Art history" is composed of the particular facts regarding the beholder and the work in historical progression. "Historical aesthetics" distills these facts into general principles. The latter term, evocative of Hegel, expresses Riegl's tenaciously held view of history as a progressive development. Yet he was unable to detect a difference, let alone progress, between "classic" and "modern" art in respect to the relation to the beholder. "Both," he wrote, "are objectivistic. Neither lets the figure look at the beholder. Rather, things happen independently from the beholder, not for the beholder's sake."'' Riegl must surely have found it problematic that the development of art was circular in the respect that he regarded as central to its history.
Riegl's studies of Dutch art appear to confront this problem directly. His first attempt to practice "art history," that is, to trace a development in the relationship between art and its beholder, was Das holliindische Gruppenportriit (1902) or correctly interpreted them in their own context, surely these portraits, whose figures look out of the frame, must have seemed an obvious point of departure for an inquiry into beholding (Fig. 1) .12 In Riegl's argument, the gaze was a vehicle for a condition he termed "external coherence" (iupere Einheit) or unification of the work of art with the beholder. On the levels both of composition and of the "pictorial conception" (Auffassung), this unity demanded "internal coherence" (innere Einheit) among the figures, without loss of individual identity.
On the level of composition, Riegl's procedure is formal. "Internal coherence" is achieved in the plane by means of line, while tensions between planar and spatial unity define precisely the relationship between the beholder in space and the work. The concept of the pictorial conception, however, departs from formal theory. In circulation since the early nineteenth century, this term meant the artist's conception of his subject matter, realized in the representation.3 To subsume the concept into formal analysis, Riegl would have had to argue that the pictorial conception consisted of forms and colors. Instead, he modified his previous slogan to read that the essence of art rested in the "pictorial conception, form and color," thus distinguishing the pictorial conception as a separate artistic element.'4 He refined the concept to refer to a specifically psychological relationship between the personalities involved in a given work of art.15 In the group portrait, these personalities include the beholder, who provides external coherence, and the figures in a portrait, all of them united by a specific psychological element, namely "attention." This attentive bond linked a unified, gazing picture, full of individual portrait figures, to an equally individualized beholder. 16 Riegl's analyses of attention are better described as narrative than formal. Rembrandt's Syndics of the Draper's Guild, for example, is a performance in which the beholder takes part. In Riegl's opinion the most fully resolved "coordination" of internal and external coherence, the painting motivates the beholder's presence dramatically (Fig. 2) .17 One officer of the guild speaks to the others. They heed his words and try to gauge their effect on an unseen party, located in the same place as the beholder.18 Their attention to the speaker establishes internal coherence, and their attention to the beholder creates external coherence; i.e., it draws the viewer into a relationship. As the focus of so much concentrated attention, he is transfixed before the canvas, while their self-awareness keeps the relationship in balance. The beholder and the "party" exchange places so often in the analysis that it is difficult to distinguish between them. Riegl almost upsets the balance in a passage imputing to the painting an almost mystical quality:
. . . Stillness reigns in the picture, so that one thinks one hears the individual words falling like drops of water. The longer one looks, the more forcibly the inner tension in which these four souls vibrate is communicated to the beholding subject. That soft admixture of self-awareness comes through in every head, along with the selfless attentiveness, like a part of the all-embracing world soul.19
The act of attention nearly overwhelms the beholder. 20 Riegl did not find attentiveness merely in figural compositions, however. Convinced of its significance for seventeenth-century Dutch art, Riegl found the quality even in portraits of nature. "The portrait conception, with its postulate of external coherence with the beholder, did not merely govern the art of the Dutch group portrait, but all of Dutch painting."21 In Rembrandt, not only people "should be bound to one another and to the beholder unity to describe the functions Riegl attributes to the relations designated by the terms "innere" and "aiu3ere Einheit," since "unity" suggests an ideal rather than a function. Kemp (as in n. 4), 22. Riegl, however, would not have used such a term himself, since he always assumed that art strove for an ideal. 17 Riegl, 1902 Riegl, /1931 In his otherwise very useful analysis of Das holliindische Gruppenportriit, Michael Podro (as in n. 8, 94) errs in referring to the unseen party as, according to Riegl, someone other than the beholder, who stands slightly to the beholder's left, and from whom the beholder, like the drapers, awaits a response. Riegl actually identifies the direction of the attention of the drapers with the beholder, for he refers to the "direkten Verkehr mit den Beschauer"; Riegl, 1902/1931, 262. He also argues that the perspectival viewpoint of the work is to the lower left, and that it is best seen from that position, where a chair was conveniently located in the museum; ibid., n. on p. 213. Riegl was not the first to discuss the direct address of the beholder in Rembrandt's painting. Theophile Thore also saw the drapers as looking directly "a la place d'ou pr&cis"ment on contemple le tableau," and adds that "ses braves syndics ont Nevertheless, Riegl's perception of the portraits accords well with his time. The popularity in German-speaking countries of the notion of pure seeing, apart from expressions of "will," and the association of selfless beholding with participation in the world soul, were rooted in an age when practically every educated person could read about this association in his own copy of Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation. Similarly, attention played a prominent role not only in Riegl's view of the seventeenth century, but in the growing science of psychology. It served Wilhelm Wundt, for example, to combat "mechanistic" psychologies of the mid-nineteenth century that conceived of the mind as a passive slate upon which "ideas" impressed themselves.36 Wundt singled out the concept of attention to rescue the principle of free will. Because of attention's apparent source in the soul of the attending person, and its exclusively internal nature, productive of no direct external effect, he thought it the primary volitional act. For Wundt as for Riegl, attention is an intransitive activity that fails to act on anything. Wundt regarded attention as the primary source of self-consciousness, since it yoked together separate, immediate impressions under the rubric of an ego. As Robert Musil later remarked, psychology was important because attention was the source of the "cogito ergo sum theory of epistemology."37 It formed the substratum of the discrimination between "subjects" and "objects," since the sense of self depends on the perception of an "other" that is not the self. Thus self-awareness arises simultaneously with sympathy, and attention acquires an ethical dimension. 38 Although Riegl thought Wundt's attempt to unseat mechanism inadequate, his own theory of attention is clearly indebted to Wundt.39 Yet Wundt's theory lacked the element crucial to Riegl. The attitudes that should have recommended the group portraits to Riegl's contemporaries pertain to the way one looks at nature and art and not to the way nature and art look back. Wundt focused on the consciousness of the attending individual, not on the confrontation between one consciousness and another. He could not have done otherwise, for the only authority he accepted was that of immediate experience, prior to which the distinction between subjects and objects does not exist.40 The "objects" are all in one's own imagination; there is only one "subject": oneself.
An art theory that closely parallels Riegl's theory of attention suggests this subjective attitude. Empathy theory, which also made its mark on Wundt, similarly personifies the work, asking the beholder to extrapolate from his knowledge of himself to architectural forms.41 But while empathy leads the beholder to read the work into his own experience, but not to interact with it, Riegl asks the beholder, through the gaze, to interact with the image as though it were a person.42 A Pygmalion-like maker decides how he wishes to relate to another person, and crafts a work with which he can perform that interaction through visual contact.
Riegl held the contemporary reliance on immediate experience responsible for the tendency to undervalue the group portrait. "All portrait painting," he wrote, "assumes that there are objective individuals, whose physical and psychological state remains completely independent of the subjective perception of some viewer."43 Consequently, not objectivity, as Riegl had previously speculated, but extreme subjectivity made it necessary for the figure in modern paintings to ignore the beholder. Riegl was now able to explain to his own satisfaction the similarity between classical and modern art.
Classical antiquity avoided this angle [toward the viewer] for it knew nothing but objects. Modern art can also do without it, but for exactly the opposite reason: it knows nothing but the subject; for according to its view, the socalled objects are completely reducible to the perception of the subject.44 "Objectivity" presupposed "that things exist completely independently from us and therefore confront us, the beholding subject, as objects."45 But moderns saw external objects as dependent on perception for their very existence. For such figments of our imagination to pay attention to us would be to claim a separate existence for themselves, and institute the opposition between subject and object. Indeed, the historical interest of Baroque art depended on this very opposition. It showed "how a newly awakened and growing subjectivity gradually came to grips with the given object and its tangible and visible qualities."46 Subjective in comparison to classic art, its dualistic acknowledgement of existing "objects" differentiated it from modern art.47 In the Dutch group portrait, Riegl thought he found a genre of painting that claims its own separate existence.
Riegl's historical comparison reveals that he did not regard attentiveness as a merely formal characteristic. A similar value judgment informs his tendency to project the compositional principles of group portraits onto the groups they portray, playing on the double meaning of the terms "subordination" and "coordination." Applied to compositional analysis, "coordination" implied not so much concerted action as the quiescent regularity of grids or scatter patterns, contrasted unfavorably to more dynamic, "subordinated" patterns.48 Riegl used the terms, but evaluated them differently. Evoking their political overtones, he sought to demonstrate that subordination needed to be tempered if not replaced by coordination, so as to preserve the identity of the individual within a group. Hence he attributed the lined-up (coordinated) pattern of sixteenthcentury portraits of pilgrims, and the lack of attentiveness to one another of the pilgrims, to the essentially personal, noncommunal nature of pilgrimage.49 A more complex compositional interaction obtains in Dirck Jacobsz's group portrait of 1529 (Fig. 1) . The civic guards, rather than "subordinate" a comrade by looking at him, ignore one another and their own intransitive actions, and relate independently to separate, unseen beholders strewn in all directions before the canvas. These beholders weld the guards together by recognition of the principles that bind them, principles conveyed through symbols of the differentiated functions necessary for group coherence (i.e., the secretary's pen and paper, the treasurer's gesture of calculation, etc.). Since the captain does not aspire to "exalt himself over his fellow guards," only a symbolic election evokes his presence: the men point to him, introducing a discrete element of subordination that Riegl attributes both to the composition and to the democratic spirit of the group.50 Where, conversely, the captain points at his men, Riegl calls the composition a "presentation," its only subject being attention.51
Other verbal associations also evoke an ethical purpose. The term "attention" had, for Riegl, overtones of paying respect to its object.52 Significantly, the word "respect" derives from the past participle of the Latin word respicere, "to look back," while Aufmerksamkeit (attention) denotes a polite or deferential act directed toward another. "Achtung," a union of "respect" and "attention," was central to Kant's ethical theory.53 Riegl characterized attentiveness as "selfless," and contrasted it with will and feeling, which suggest power relations. In his view, "will" seeks to overcome the external world, and "feeling" either capitulates before the external world in pleasure, or battles against it There is even a religious element in Riegl's interpretation of attention. Its origin was the respect for the external world legislated by Early Christian ethics. Riegl called this "objective" phase "attention in the Christian sense."59 Later, increasing specificity in time and space allowed the depiction of attention as the free choice of the individual. The perfect balance of subject and object reached in the Syndics depends on a mixture of self-interest with the fully internalized imperative to deal honestly with the public.60 Since a feeling that is too egoistic can submerge attention, he argued that feeling is infused into the portrait "not in the form of self-awareness . . . but as sympathy, which rejects all subordination and simply motivates attention in an outward direction."61 The term "sympathy" evokes the ethical implications that Wundt, too, ascribed to attention.
Even in the demise of attentiveness, an ethical element was present. Its last, "novelistic," phase had almost sinister overtones. External coherence was created by so engrossing the beholder in an analysis of the psychological ties between the characters that the scene becomes his own inner experience.62 The distrust with which Riegl viewed this phase is suggested in his description of the style of genre painting from which he thought it emerged. In such paintings as the Terborch that Riegl knew as Paternal Admonition, selfless attention becomes "an assumed mask" under which lie "secret passions which the master knew how to disguise in the most clever fashion" (Fig. 4) . clearly enough that they were aware of the beholder. But they also believed that, in addition, they had to take into account the objective character of things. And this openly acknowledged conjunction of objective and subjective phenomena in the picture cannot be interpreted as hypocrisy, but as an honest avowal of their dualism.64 "Dishonest" art did not confront the beholder; it turned its back.65
It follows that

The Ethics of Formal Analysis
Riegl's formal system also followed an ethical agenda. It grew out of an attempt to defend artistic representation against the threat of subjectivity. A phenomenon sometimes termed the "revolt against positivism" entailed an increasing awareness of the subjectivity of perception.66 Scientists questioned the project of acquiring valid knowledge and forming sound judgments. Thinkers faced the epistemological dilemma of explaining how one can validate impressions, yet affirm their essential subjectivity. In art, this dilemma took the form of doubts about the adequacy of what were previously assumed to be natural, that is, immediately accessible, modes of representation. Both Impressionism and Symbolism sought immediacy, attempting to overcome subject-object duality through an elemental experience of union. The risk they ran was to seem arbitrary -either solipsistic or, worse, conventional. While realist artists never doubted the possibility of contacting material reality through the senses, the psychology that engaged Impressionists and Symbolists found the distinction between external perceptions and hallucination at best problematic.67 The fear of deterioration into arbitrary solipsism haunted critics and artists, who sought means to make art comprehensible and verifiable through an objective basis, such as could be found in the artist's craft, comparative anthropology, or psychophysics.
In late nineteenth-century Vienna, the subjectivity of perception came to be seen as a threat to the cohesiveness of the individual. While Ernst Mach drew crowds when he lectured at the university on the view that physical objects are only complexes of sensation, and Freud investigated the "other" in the unconscious, dramatists and poets pondered the threat to man's ability to communicate with his fellow man.68 Writers of Jung Wien took for their theme the mercurial nature of the ego, and its lack of external corroboration for its disjointed impressions. teenth-century thinker, he turned to perceptual psychology to combat relativism. Although perception could not place one in definitive contact with a knowable world, perception itself was thought to be universal, and hence capable of determining relationships within human society and between the individual and the world.73 The perceptual theory he subscribed to associated "objective reality" (and the belief therein) with palpability, and "subjectivity" with opticality. The sense of touch isolated objects in order to validate their separate material existence.74 This in turn validated the subjective "optical" relationships into which the visual sense can unite them. Riegl's system of formal analysis grew out of this pursuit. He sought to validate artistic images by tracing their formal attributes to the optical and tactile senses. If the viewer could be convinced that he could touch an object, he would believe in its reality, and hence its ability to enter into a(n optical) relationship.
In the formal language of Spiitrbmische Kunstindustrie, the work of art mirrors the relationships that a culture wishes to see in the world.75 The ancients, according to Riegl, utilized references to "tactile" qualities in order to assure themselves of the material reality of the objects they depicted. Later cultures united these objects optically. Thus formal signs of perception, not naturalistic representation, became markers of artistic validity, or the reference of art to something outside of itself. Not surprisingly, Riegl worried about the contemporary preponderance of artistic opticality, and repeatedly looked for indications that the palpable element would reemerge. 76 The project had consequences for the conception of the work of art as a unified whole. For a work that was to illustrate relationships, perfect unity was undesirable; hence Riegl's attention, in Spiitr6mische Kunstindustrie, to the isolation of parts from one another and in the plane. Riegl did not regard this separation, secured by the sense of touch, as limited to late Roman art, however. All art, he wrote, is a "matter of coming to terms between the subject on the one hand and the thing (i.e., extension, space) on the other hand, and by no means a full dissolution of the object in the subject, which would absolutely mean the end of the fine arts." Even though moderns might emphasize color over the "character of palpability," the object exists and cannot be disregarded completely in favor of the attribute.77
The theory of attention is due to the same desire to give humanity a common basis on which to communicate, in the recognition of the reality -difference, separationof the external world. As the passage just cited illustrates, the language of touch and sight continues in Das holliindische Gruppenportriit. But perceptual metaphors play only a supporting role here. Art does not depict a relationship in this drama, but rather performs it with the beholder. This approach to art seems to want to liberate art from signs, giving art the look of a natural mode of communication. Even if not palpably "real," an object convincingly acts out its relationship to a beholder if it pays attention to that beholder, and acknowledges its own existence as a subject. The theory of attention, then, can be seen as an attempt to preserve communication while circumventing the issue of representation.
The presence of a hermeneutical element in this theory is corroborated by Riegl's historical practice, which, as mentioned above, made use of a dialogue with the present to identify the distinguishing element in the past. Indeed, he used a perceptual metaphor to describe the attitude of his contemporaries toward the material remains of the past. Their "value for history," which grasped individual events, was "as though objectively palpable." Like respect for the object, Riegl thought he saw the value for history being submerged in a more subjective relation to the past. The "value for age" (Alterswert) subsumed the object in the subject to produce "moods" (Stimmungen).78 In his view, the scholar's establishment of the otherness of the past prepared the way for the more subjective value, but was also in conflict with it. Riegl compared the modern historian to the philosophers of late antiquity, who, as intellectuals, introduced the teachings later popularized -and emotionalized -by Christianity.79 Thus Riegl's formal aesthetics, like his "theatrical" aesthetics, grew out of a critique of society. He feared that modern man had lost contact with the external facts of the world and with his fellow man. Riegl sought not only to arouse interest in painters of the past who respected the role of art in facilitating human communication, but, at a deeper level, to address the problem at the heart of modern man's excessive subjectivity. As Riegl saw it, man had lost confidence in the shared, communicable "reality" of the visible world, including the ability of art to represent. Riegl's system of formal analysis attempted to show how formal artistic elements could "represent" through reference to the perceptual modes in which man confronts his world. But his theory of attention attempted more; it suggested how art could transcend the problem of representation. Instead of serving to represent the world, art could aspire to share it with the beholder.
The Formalism of Attentiveness
Riegl's concern for attentive viewing was not isolated in the early twentieth century. It had important implications for fields outside of art. His ideas emerge from the same concerns, and draw on a similar educational background at the University of Vienna, as Edmund Husserl's contemporaneously evolving phenomenology. Like Riegl, this fellow student of the philosopher Franz Brentano sought to determine the extent to which self-perception depended on the perception of others, and identified a perceptual basis for acceptance of the other. Fueled by empathy theory, he argued that the beholder comprehends the existence of others by comparing their bodies with his own, and extending the external comparison to interior states. Husserl's motivation was primarily epistemological, an attempt, parallel to that of Riegl, to account for objectivity.80
Even closer to Riegl's ethical theory of attention is a theological theory. An author who once registered in Riegl's course in Dutch art declared that "living is meeting." Martin Buber, like Riegl in his essay on Ruisdael, illustrated "meeting" with reference to a tree: "The tree is no impression, no play of my imagination, no Stimmung-value, but it is bodied over against me and has to do with me, as I with it.
..."81
The impression, the Stimmung, and indeed, any generalization about an object are all internal, and do not constitute relationships. The object exists only in the subject's mind. The I-Thou relationship parallels attention. It presupposes otherness, and it balances passivity (being acted upon) and acting (acting upon) so as to ensure our presence to one another.82 In contrast, according to Riegl and Buber, he who depends on Stimmung rather than mutuality to contact the external world courts solipsism. He threatens to subsume the world into himself and remain alone rather than overcome isolation in communication.
Riegl's concern for suspending isolation without destroying independence is still evident today in scholars' preoccupation with difference and dialogue. As I have noted earlier, Bakhtin's Buber-influenced espousal of dialogism has recently aroused interest among literary theorists. The dialogical aspects of Husserl and Buber, too, command the attention of philosophers.83 Hans-Georg Gadamer explored the possibilities of openness to the "thou" in a hermeneutics based on the attempt to engage in "conversation" with tradition.84 Stanley Cavell, in discussions of the notions of "neighboring" and "acknowledgement," brought out the ethical significance of the concern for the beholder (reader) and its repercussion on communication.85 Like Riegl's attempt to include the beholder, all of these theories of the "Other" reflect a strongly felt need to hypothesize language so that it makes reference to the external world. Contemporary theorists often express fears that such recent theoretical developments as deconstruction pose as great a danger to the belief in reference as did mid-century formalism.86
Furthermore, the notion of beholding has been important in the visual arts. Even in the nineteenth century, Riegl's statement that modern paintings do not look at the viewer was not true of all paintings.87 In the twentieth century, however, it is fair to say that the situation of beholding became an artistic issue. Ruisdael's houses may or may not permit themselves to be read as faces. Those of Gustav Klimt, however, are easy to interpret as imitations of the coyly beholding faces in some of his portraits (Figs. 5, 6 ). Egon Schiele's Windows are more brazen than those of Klimt, but the effect of beholding is similar (Fig. 7) . Although this is not the context in which to make an extended argument about beholding in landscape painting, certainly in figural compositions artists have used technical devices comparable to those seen in the Dutch group portraits described by Riegl. Leo Steinberg has postulated a relationship between these portraits and Picasso's Les Demoiselles d'Avignon in regard to the technical devices used to achieve external coherence, although he rightly does not conclude The natural language of form disseminated by Riegl and others at the turn of the century, and assumed by writers in the mid-twentieth century, also made possible the art they discussed. Surely the worst that can be said of Minimalism is not that it aimed at a relationship to the beholder, but that it failed to achieve this relationship through formal means. Without a natural language of form, the beholder needs a sophisticated understanding of conventional notions of form to know whether a work calls for direct confrontation or the visual analysis of parts. The ability to comply with the work's demand becomes the educational acquisition that distinguishes a social class.100 The work fails to engage basic processes of perception.
It might seem that the literal gaze, as opposed to that of the anthropomorphic cube of the Minimalists, does not depend on the dubious existence of a natural language. Beholding, however, is indeed entailed with forms that can be conventional. The viewer of Diane Arbus's morally ambiguous representations of the image-beholder, subjectphotographer relationship is driven to reassess Evans's Sharecropper's Wife with the knowledge that even a gaze is a form (Fig. 9 ). Arbus's image can be interpreted as belonging to a genre of contemporary images that critique the conventional assumption of a natural language. On its own, the structure of beholding can neither initiate nor evade a relationship with its beholder. It can, however, allude to the possibility or denial of relationships, even if only within time-bound formal conventions. The present need to rethink the role of intersubjectivity in art brings into focus this central concern of Riegl's thought, a concern to which we, in our own dialogue with him, now need to attend. 
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